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A B S T R A C T
The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of
economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a
debate on Europe’s representation in the international finan-
cial institutions. A single EU representation at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of
power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation
of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A
reduction in the number of European executive directors,
and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contri-
bution to the Fund’s general resources, could go hand in
hand with an increase in the Union’s impact on IMF deci-
sion-making. Such a change would also weaken the coop-
erative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number
and impact of mixed constituencies.
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Introduction
The introduction of the euro and the institutional strengthening of the
coordination of economic policies in the European Union (EU) are fuelling a
reflection on the representation of Europe in the international financial insti-
tutions. Both in Europe and elsewhere, calls are mounting for European
position taking and representation in international forums to be streamlined,
a process that could end in a single EU representation, as in the World Trade
Organization. The outcome is – at least in the view of many current member
states of the Union – a long-term objective of the EU.
In the light of the establishment of a single monetary policy, the question
of a single external EU representation is of particular relevance with regard
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is at the core of the inter-
national financial system. Through its almost worldwide membership, the
surveillance it exerts over its members’ policies, and the assistance and condi-
tional emergency financing it provides, the Fund is a major instrument
contributing to macroeconomic and financial stability.
The establishment of a single EU representation would constitute a
historical change in the IMF membership, and would raise major governance
issues. Although this article focuses on these issues in relation to the IMF, it
also touches on ‘spillover effects’ for the governance of other international
financial institutions and forums.
These matters have to be approached within the perspective of the
ongoing, broad debate on the governance of the IMF. With the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, the Fund
had lost its core function with regard to balance of payments crises, and
thereby also – in the eyes of many – its raison d’être. The institution has never-
theless returned to the foreground, in particular as an instrument for the
prevention and resolution of financial crises. However, since the succession
of crises in the 1990s, which were primarily capital account driven, the effec-
tiveness of the Fund’s surveillance and its governance have been increasingly
questioned. Basically, the Fund has been under criticism for being in-
sufficiently transparent, independent and accountable, as illustrated by De
Gregorio et al. (1999). The organization was able to react positively to many
of these reproaches, in particular increasing transparency.
It follows from the analysis developed in this article that the creation of
a single EU chair might affect two of the major ongoing controversies: the
excessive politicization of the Fund’s decision-making, and the unbalanced
representation of its members. First, critics point to the current dispropor-
tional influence of IMF staff on the one hand, and of the Group of Seven (G7)
on the other hand, on the Fund’s decision-making. The G7 countries are
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believed to bring into the IMF decision-making process their own geopoliti-
cal considerations, which can be at odds with sound governance of the insti-
tution. Although many acknowledge that political considerations are difficult
to discard when deciding whether or not to provide Fund financing, it is often
stressed that the IMF’s surveillance activities should be exerted in a more
objective and independent way. We demonstrate that establishing a single EU
chair could, on the one hand, provide a countervailing power for the
perceived imbalances. On the other hand, it might further exacerbate the
trend towards polarization in IMF governance, because the result could be a
duopoly of big creditors at the head of the IMF, whose ability to provide real
leadership remains to be demonstrated. We will further argue that the extent
to which the EU will be willing and able to define a common external policy
could be crucial in this respect.
A second criticism of the IMF is the insufficient voice, both in terms of
voting power and in terms of number of executive directors (EDs), that is
given to emerging economies and developing countries, while industrialized
countries, and Europe in particular, are deemed to benefit from excessive
representation. In this respect, the establishment of a single EU chair could
provide a window of opportunity for bringing the actual quotas in the Fund
more in line with newly calculated quotas. The quota of the EU chair could
indeed be set significantly below the sum of the actual quotas of the EU
member states, and there might be a fundamental reallocation of quotas and
EDs among the Fund membership. A single EU chair might involve the inter-
esting paradox that a reduction in the number of European EDs, in the global
voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund’s general resources
could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union’s impact on IMF
decision-making. Additionally, it would also affect the cooperative nature of
the Fund. Originally, this nature was underpinned by the possibility for each
member to become both a Fund creditor and a Fund debtor, depending on
that member’s needs. Over the years, the relative economic development of
IMF members has led to a growing separation between creditor and debtor
countries. Nevertheless, EU countries, through their involvement in mixed
constituencies, have so far mitigated the detrimental effects on the coopera-
tive nature of the IMF of too strong a division between creditor and debtor
chairs. The number and impact of mixed constituencies in the Fund could,
however, be reduced significantly by the establishment of a single EU chair.
Undoubtedly, member states’ political will is a vital prerequisite for the
process to be set in motion and the effective impact would very much depend
on the governance of the EU chair itself (i.e. the way in which its positions
are determined and, more broadly, how its functioning is organized). It can
be argued that a common EU foreign policy constitutes a prerequisite for an
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effective leading European role in the decision-making process at the IMF.
However, a unique EU membership might be arranged before a binding
consensus is reached on the establishment of a common foreign policy. The
recent decision to appoint a president of the Eurogroup for a two-year period
points in that direction. EU positions at the Fund should then be prepared
either through coordination mechanisms between national authorities (which
already function today, be it – evidently – within a different framework, the
Fund remaining a country-based institution), or via a more independent EU
institution (existing or newly created).
A single EU chair, by profoundly affecting the balance of power at the
IMF and through its inextricable links with the internal governance of 
the Union, would inevitably lead to a further and comprehensive debate on
the governance of the international financial system. What could be seen as
a positive step on the long road to further European integration would
undoubtedly have major implications extending far beyond the borders of
the Union and the functioning of the IMF as such. Hence, the European Union
has to consider carefully all the implications of possible actions in this field.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we analyse the
potential impact of a single EU chair on the IMF members’ quota shares. We
then focus on the likely consequences for the governance of the IMF, assess-
ing the impact on decision-making at the IMF and the importance of EU
internal governance in this process. Finally, we consider the impact on other
international organizations.
The establishment of a single EU quota
A member’s quota is at the core of its relations with the IMF. In addition to
fixing its contribution to the general resources of the Fund, a member’s quota
determines its voting power,1 affects its borrowing capacity and determines
its share in the allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
A single EU chair could be set up in various ways. In a first scenario, all
EU countries could remain Fund members individually, while also being
grouped in a single EU constituency. Or, as in the United Arab Republic case
(1958–61), there might be a single EU chair that would take over the actual
quotas of the countries it replaces but with the basic votes of a single member.
Both possibilities would imply a status quo for the actual quota shares of all
other IMF members, while the EU chair would inherit a vast voting power.
Bini-Smaghi (2004) however considers a single EU constituency with an
adapted quota share.
In a second scenario, the EU as such could become a member, for which
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a new ‘fully fledged and single’ quota would need to be established. The
starting point for the determination of a Fund member’s quota is its calcu-
lated quota. This number is the outcome of formulas based on economic vari-
ables related to the different functions that quotas perform. First, a country’s
potential contribution to the IMF’s general resources is determined by its
economic size, its foreign reserves and the strength of its balance of payments
position. Second, the quota formulas are intended to reflect a country’s
economic and financial impact on the rest of the world. Third, because quotas
also determine normal access limits to Fund financing, the formulas relate to
the potential borrowing needs of a country, which in turn are a function of
the size of the country, its openness and current account imbalances, the vari-
ability of its receipts, and the amount of its reserves.
The actual quota shares of the IMF members were last adapted on the
basis of calculated quotas computed for the eleventh general review of quotas
(CQ11).2 However, owing among other things to the primacy of equi-
proportional adjustments (distributed to all members according to their
existing, actual quota shares) in general quota reviews, there still exist rela-
tively substantial differences between the calculated and actual quotas.
The quota calculations for a single EU chair would logically be based on
data for the EU as a whole, excluding intra-EU flows. The outcome of these
calculations, as a percentage of total Fund quotas (see Figure 1), would be
smaller than the sum of the former individual (calculated and actual) quota
shares of the EU member states. It should be kept in mind that any change
in the EU quota share logically and inevitably entails a change in the quota
shares of the other IMF members.
We have computed new calculated quota shares (NCQS) for the option
under which a new single quota would be attributed to the EU chair, repre-
senting the current 25 member states of the Union. Our computations are
based upon the five existing quota formulas and use the data from the twelfth
quota review. Although there have been in recent (and earlier) years many
discussions on a revision of the current quota formulas, it is very likely that
any future alternative formula will still largely be based on gross domestic
product (GDP) and balance of payments data.
The left-hand bars of the figure show the calculated quotas (CQ11) as
they were computed for the eleventh quota review for the largest members
and for various relevant groups of countries. The middle bars indicate the
actual quota shares of these members (Actual), which for various technical
and political reasons differ from the CQ11. The right-hand bars give the newly
calculated quota shares (NCQS).
It appears from our computations that the EU and the US chairs have a
similar new calculated quota share.3 This mainly follows from a downward
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adjustment of the single EU quota share, as compared with the aggregate
quota share of the 25 EU countries, largely owing to the exclusion of current
account flows among the members. Every non-EU country gains a part of the
difference. In addition, the recent relative economic development of the Fund
members also plays a role in the adjustment, because the NCQS are based on
economic data that are more recent than the data underlying the current
quotas. These effects may be substantial for China and other emerging
countries, but for European economies they are almost negligible at present,
because the recent growth rate of this group of countries is relatively close to
the world average growth rate.
Once the European quota share is adapted/reduced towards its new
calculated quota share, the other IMF members will gain a part of the differ-
ence. This redistribution could be done in an equi-proportional way, accord-
ing to existing actual quotas. However, the adaptation of the EU quota share
might also trigger a general reshuffle, with the quota shares of all IMF
members being adapted towards their new calculated quota shares.
Between the ‘status quo’ option (one EU constituency) and a full align-
ment of actual quota shares with calculated quota shares, there are many
scenarios. History shows that, on the road from calculated quota to actual
quota, political considerations play an important role. There is a very strong
probability that such considerations will play an equally prominent role in
European Union Politics 6(4)4 9 8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
5
2 
U
E
s
et
at
S 
d
eti
n
U
n
a
p
a
J
a
ni
h
C
er
o
p
a
g
ni
S
a
d
a
n
a
C
ai
s
s
u
R
a i
b
ar
A i
d
u
a
S
l
airt
s
u
d
ni r
e
ht
O
s
eirt
n
u
o
c
n
a
ci rf
A
s
ei
c
n
e
ut it
s
n
o
c
g
ni
gr
e
m
e r
e
ht
O
st
e
kr
a
m
sr
e
b
m
e
m r
e
ht
O
 
e
 (
%
)
r
a
h
s 
at
o
u
Q
CQ11 Actual NCQS
Members
Figure 1 IMF members’ quotas. 
Sources: IMF, NBB. 
Notes: CQ11 = calculated quota shares computed for the eleventh quota review and based on
1982–94 data. NCQS = new calculated quota shares based on 1987–99 data, used for the twelfth
quota review.
deciding the voting power of a single EU chair. Specific points concerning
that topic will be discussed below.
Implications for the decision-making process at the IMF
A single EU chair at the IMF would have important political implications. It
would obviously affect the composition of the executive board. Moreover,
changes to the quotas of IMF members and thus their voting power would
affect the political governance of the IMF.
Changes in the composition of the IMF executive board
Article XII Section 3b of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides for 5
appointed and 15 elected executive directors (EDs) for the IMF executive
board.
The five IMF members with the largest quota (currently the USA, Japan,
Germany, France and the UK) each appoint one ED representing their country.
With a single EU chair, Europe would give up two appointed EDs. If we stick
to the NCQS ranking, these could be transferred to China and Canada or
Singapore,4 whereas the actual quotas would rank Saudi Arabia fourth and
China and Canada equal fifth (Figure 1). Such a transfer would be welcomed
by critics who claim that Europe is overrepresented vis-à-vis emerging
markets. Alternatively, the number of appointed EDs could be cut, by
changing Article XII. A reduction could indeed be appropriate in view of the
gap in voting power between the EU/USA and the country ranked third.
As to the number of elected EDs, the board of governors may, by an 85%
majority, reduce or increase it. At the moment, there are 19 elected EDs. Four
of them are EU representatives: the Nordic,5 Belgian, Dutch and Italian EDs.
They represent 4 constituencies totalling 37 countries. These include all EU
countries except Spain, Ireland and Poland.6 The creation of a single EU chair
would require a rescheduling of these constituencies: 15 countries would need
to change places;7 they might either become members of existing constituen-
cies or form new constituencies. In the process, the total number of constituen-
cies could be reduced. Alternatively, one or two additional EDs could be made
available to the rest of the membership, in particular to the less well-
represented developing countries.
The decline of mixed constituencies
Saudi Arabia, China and Russia elect EDs who represent only their own
country. The other 16 EDs are elected by constituencies of several countries.
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Some of these multi-country constituencies are very homogeneous; others are
much more heterogeneous – these are the so-called mixed constituencies.
There is no clear definition or exact list of mixed constituencies. Authors
usually refer to constituencies comprising countries with different interests.
Some also mention geographical or economic criteria, and others vaguely
refer to the creditor/debtor distinction.
A first criterion consists in comparing the GDP of the countries within a
constituency. GDP per capita figures offer a more accurate reflection of the
heterogeneity of economic development than do absolute GDP figures,
because the latter depend too much on the population size of the country. A
constituency with one large country and several small countries may then be
classified as mixed although it may be economically homogeneous. Measur-
ing the relative deviation of GDP per capita within constituencies, the follow-
ing constituencies may be considered as mixed: Australian (Australia versus
the others), Belgian (Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg versus the others),
Dutch (the Netherlands versus the others), Indonesian (Singapore and Brunei
Darussalam versus the others), Spanish (Spain versus Latin America),
English-speaking and French-speaking Sub-Saharan, and Swiss (Switzerland
versus Central and Eastern Europe). Although the two Sub-Saharan
constituencies comprise only economically poor countries, they are still
heterogeneous because the GDP per capita differences between the poor and
the very poor remain substantial. The relatively strong growth of countries
such as Gabon and Mauritius, for instance, is a major factor in the economic
heterogeneity of the French-speaking African constituency.
Secondly, dividing the world in broadly geographical terms, we could
classify the following constituencies as mixed: Australian, Belgian, Canadian,
Dutch, Indonesian and Swiss (see Table 1).
Thirdly, we could consider the creditor/debtor status of the member
countries. This criterion best reflects a country’s IMF status because creditor
and debtor countries have very different interests in the IMF. We define as
debtors those countries that used IMF resources during a 10-year time-span
(1992–2001). There were, of course, many more countries that were debtors
between 1992 and 2001 than exclusively in 2001. But a 10-year analysis takes
greater account of the vulnerability/fragility of borrowers. Under this
criterion only one constituency (French-speaking African) is entirely homo-
geneous. All other constituencies include both debtor and creditor countries.
We hence fix a threshold and define constituencies with at least 75% debtors
or creditors as homogeneous constituencies. Using this criterion, the
Australian, Belgian, Canadian, English-speaking African, Indonesian, Italian
and Nordic constituencies can be considered as mixed (see Table 1).
European Union Politics 6(4)5 0 0
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Table 1 Heterogeneity of multi-country constituencies
Criterion
Geographical Share
of 
Constituency debtorsa Composition
Indian 75 India and 3 neighbouring countries
Iranian 86 Iran, Ghana, Afghanistan, Pakistan
and 3 Maghreb countries
Brazilian 78 Brazil and 8 South American
countries
Argentinian 83 Argentina and 5 South American
countries
Nordic 38 5 Scandinavian and 3 Baltic
countries
Italian 29 Italy, Greece, Portugal, Albania, 
San Marino, Malta and Timor-Leste
Canadian Mixed 58 Canada, Ireland and 10 Caribbean
countries
Egyptian 23 Egypt, Maldives and 11 Arab
countries
Belgian Mixed 70 Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Belarus
and Kazakhstan
Australian Mixed 43 Australia, Korea, Mongolia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines and 
9 Pacific countries
Spanish 75 Spain, Mexico, Venezuela and 5
Central American countries
English-speaking African 68 South Africa, Nigeria and 17 mainly
English-speaking African countries
French-speaking African 100 24 mainly French-speaking African
countries
Dutch Mixed 83 Netherlands, Cyprus, Bulgaria,
Romania, Israel, 3 Balkan and 4 CIS
countries
Indonesian Mixed 58 Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Singapore, 6 Asian and 
2 Pacific countries
Swiss Mixed 75 Switzerland, Poland, 
Serbia-Montenegro and 5 CIS
countries
Sources: GDP per capita (authors’ calculations based on historic IMF and World Bank data).
a Share of debtor countries between 1992 and 2001 in the constituency.
Mixed constituencies have an important role in the governance of the
IMF. They fulfil a bridge function between the interests of rich and poor,
industrialized and less-developed, northern and southern, creditor and
debtor countries. Executive directors of mixed constituencies have to take into
account the interests of all the member countries of their constituency and,
depending on their importance and involvement in the issue at stake and on
the internal governance mechanisms of their constituency, EDs will have to
make up their mind and express the opinion of their authorities. The consen-
sus built within the constituency may already prepare or prefigure a consen-
sus on the board, since the different interests within the executive board may
be represented, on a smaller scale, within the constituency.
The heterogeneous composition of mixed constituencies may occasion-
ally also push the EDs of these constituencies to a more politically indepen-
dent stance. This was illustrated in the approval of Mexico’s Stand-by
Arrangement in February 1995 and in various recent board decisions on
Argentina, where EDs of mixed constituencies abstained. Mixed constituen-
cies thereby may contribute to balanced political positions within the IMF. In
several cases, the EDs of mixed constituencies have played a decisive role in
striking a balance between the interests of industrial and developing
countries. Although sharing industrial countries’ views on many issues, they
have also often taken the same position as developing countries, and even
helped to outvote industrial countries. Van Houtven (2002) illustrates, for
instance, how during the 2000 review of Fund facilities several mixed
constituencies supported the EDs of developing countries in resisting an
increase in the rate of charge advocated by the G7.
In the end, mixed constituencies may often be a better mouthpiece for
developing countries than are constituencies of less-developed countries,
because the influence of the former is generally much higher. The creation of
a single EU chair at the IMF would greatly reduce the number of mixed
constituencies. According to geographical and debtor/creditor criteria, an EU
constituency would be a homogeneous constituency. With 25 or 28 countries,
the EU would have a debtor ratio of only 8% or 18%, respectively. There
would thus be fewer institutional bridges between industrialized European
countries and other countries at different levels of development.
The growing political importance of the EU
In 1958, when the European Economic Community was established, its six
founding members held 15.75% of total IMF voting power, and the USA held
25.78%. Until now, the aggregated quota share of the EU members has been
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growing: not only has the number of Union members risen to 25, but their
overall share in the world economy, and thus their calculated quota, has also
increased. The growth in the number of IMF members (from 45 to 184) is the
main reason why the share of the USA has decreased to 17.4% (see Figure 2).
Nevertheless, the USA remains the only member with a veto right on
votes requiring an 85% majority8 and is by far the largest member (almost
three times bigger than the next largest). The nation’s political and economic
power obviously reinforces this position. Moreover, since the IMF headquar-
ters are located in the territory of the member having the largest quota, US
ideas and opinions are relatively influential because they are close at hand.
In practice, the single US position at the IMF has only seldom been confronted
with a strong and single European voice. However, helped by shared values
and reinforced coordination mechanisms since the advent of economic and
monetary union, EU countries increasingly find themselves on the same side
on essential issues, such as the establishment of a mechanism facilitating
sovereign debt restructuring, analysed by the National Bank of Belgium
(2003).
A scenario in which a single EU chair inherits the actual quotas of the
EU membership and thus would have a veto power on votes requiring a 70%
majority9 may not seem very plausible from a political point of view. Since
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Figure 2 The evolution of IMF voting power. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on historic IMF and World Bank data. 
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the economic data relevant for quota calculations are similar for the USA and
the EU, there are objective arguments in favour of a convergence of the actual
quotas of the two chairs. The quota for the EU chair could hence be signifi-
cantly below the sum of the actual quotas of the EU member states. One
element in the forthcoming – ultimately political – discussion might never-
theless be the observation that, in the process, Europe would be ready to give
up six of its current seven EDs.
An interesting paradox in this field is that a reduction in the number of
European EDs, in the global voting power of Europe and in its contribution
to the Fund’s general resources could go hand in hand with an increase in
the Union’s impact on IMF decision-making. A single EU chair would indeed
have both the power to veto important decisions and substantial constructive
power to foster decisions. Leech (2002) illustrates this by calculating power
indices for IMF members. His results prove that, for ordinary IMF decisions
requiring a 50% majority, the USA currently has political power far in excess
of its voting weight, since it does not need many other members to form a
winning coalition. According to such indices, a single EU chair would have
more power than the EU members taken together.
Note that adapting actual quotas towards calculated quotas for the entire
Fund membership might go against the current trend of strengthening the
voices of the low-income countries. One way of compensating for this might
be to increase the basic votes, i.e. the number of voting rights each Fund
member automatically receives, regardless of its quota.
The increased polarization of IMF governance
The creation of a single EU chair would drastically change the balance of
power at the IMF. The EU chair and the USA, each with a veto power for 85%
majority votes, would together also be able to veto 70% majority decisions.
And, for simple majority decisions (50%), an alliance of the USA, Europe and
Japan (or China in the near future) would be sufficient. Once the large chairs
agreed on a specific issue, it would be difficult to reject or block their agree-
ment. However, it remains a moot point whether in real life a Fund with two
main players would function better than under the prevailing structure.
At the current juncture, there is already a tendency towards
creditor/debtor polarization in IMF governance. The importance of the two
largest members and the decline of mixed constituencies might further impair
the cooperative nature of the IMF. Although the IMF was originally a co-
operative in which a country could be a creditor one year and a debtor another
year, creditor and debtor countries have become two more clearly distinct
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categories. The Fund risks becoming a forum where creditors and debtors are
in opposition, and where only minority debtors ask for financing. Neverthe-
less, the diversity of interests of EU countries, the functioning of mixed
constituencies and, more recently, the element of ‘peer review’ in surveillance
and financial sector assessment activities still favour the cooperative nature
of the IMF. The creation of a single EU chair with a clear, single European
position and the waning importance of mixed constituencies this entails
would affect this cooperative nature. Much will depend on the positions taken
by the EU chair. The internal decision-making process of the EU will there-
fore be very important.
The impact of internal EU governance on the IMF
The implications of the introduction of a single EU chair will depend very
much on the internal governance of the EU. Specific mechanisms will have
to be set up to operate, at the more technical level, the duties and rights of
an EU chair at the IMF and to establish, at the political level, the European
positions. These mechanisms might or might not function within the broader
framework of a common European foreign policy.
Currently, the European Commission and the European Central Bank
(ECB) have observer status at the IMF – the former, however, only on the
International Monetary and Financial Committee, the latter on the executive
board as well. Voting power lies entirely with the EU countries, the Fund
still being a country-based institution. Nevertheless, coordination is increas-
ing, both at a technical level (through the setting up of specific committees,
in Brussels as well as in Washington) and at the political level (in particular
within the Eurogroup, which has recently decided to institute a two-year
presidency).
A situation in which all EU countries came together in one constituency
(or a membership similar to that of the United Arab Republic) would have
less effect on the rights and duties of the countries concerned. Each EU
member state would remain a member of the Fund individually, although
Europe would have to speak with one voice and cast a single vote. The
decision-making process in the constituency would be based mainly on a
confrontation of the national interests of the members, as is already the case
in multi-country constituencies. A major difference in relation to the current
situation of increased coordination would be the need for an ex ante
commitment to reaching a common view, because an ED can take only one
position.
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In another scenario, if the EU became a fully fledged single member of
the Fund, it would obviously inherit the duties and rights of the actual
European IMF member states. This would have more far-reaching impli-
cations. The single EU member would contribute to IMF financing according
to its quota. Equally, since the IMF deals only with its members and not with
sub-entities, the Fund would exert surveillance under Article IV of the
Articles of Agreement over the European Union as a whole, and it would no
longer be able to provide financing to individual member states of the Union.
Whether a single chair will be introduced, and what positions it will take
in IMF decision-making, will largely depend on the progress made in the
unification of foreign policies. If the European Union succeeds in formulat-
ing a common foreign policy, in addition to a common monetary policy, a
single EU membership of the Fund would become inevitable. In such a situ-
ation, and obviously depending on the clarity of the common foreign policy,
all conditions would be present for the European chair to be able to define
and defend clear-cut positions.
A common foreign policy would, however, imply compromise among EU
members. As suggested by Frieden (2004), each individual member would
have to weigh the impact of a greater role for Europe against the potential
costs of a policy not to its liking. Hence, the greater the divergence of views
among EU member states, the less likely the EU is to agree on a common
foreign policy. And countries whose preferences are further from the EU
median than from the international median are more likely to oppose the
pooling of representation.
However, if the EU were to opt for single membership before foreign
policy is unified, EU positions at the IMF would risk becoming either watered
down or largely technocratic. The coordination of national positions would
indeed be a cumbersome process, whose outcome would likely be a compro-
mise reflecting the lowest common denominator among still highly differing
political views of member states. If IMF position-taking were left to a more
or less independent institution of the EU, a factor for tensions within the
Union and between the Union and its member states would be built into the
system, and at the same time the accountability of the Fund could suffer.
The link between EU and IMF governance obviously is a two-way
relationship. The Union’s internal organization with regard to its single chair
at the Fund would undoubtedly be influenced by the degree to which the
IMF is a rule-based institution, providing a clear and transparent framework
for decision-taking, with well-defined objectives and proper accountability.
The higher the degree of discretion in managing the Fund, the more difficult
it would be to organize a well-functioning EU chair, able to reach well-defined
positions within the requisite (often short) time-span.
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Potential implications for other international economic
and financial organizations
The creation of a single EU chair at the IMF would also affect other inter-
national economic and financial forums and the global external representa-
tion of the EU countries. Apart from the IMF, there is a vast array of
international groupings where EU countries are represented. The composi-
tion of these groups varies. In some of them, the European voice is already
present via the European Commission and/or the ECB. In others, only some
European countries are represented (see Table 2). The creation of a single EU
chair at the IMF might be coupled with a review of how EU countries are
represented in the other international financial forums. It would in all prob-
ability influence the governance of the World Bank. Should a single EU seat
at the IMF also give rise to single representation at the World Bank? Such a
move might be facilitated by the relative similarity between the governance
of the two institutions (the constituencies are almost identical and their voting
power is very similar). In addition, the Bank and the Fund already collab-
orate closely on country programmes and conditionality.
The consequences of a single EU chair at the Fund would probably be quite
noticeable within the G7. The G7 has a decisive influence on IMF decision-
making, and the Managing Director of the Fund usually participates, by invi-
tation, in the surveillance discussions of the G7 (or G8) finance ministers and
central bank governors. The EU already participates in the G7 (Table 2). If the
EU countries start speaking with one voice within this group, a single European
representation could replace the current EU member states’ representatives.
This group would then become a group of four, with the EU and the USA as
major participants. The governance of the IMF with its two major blocs, the EU
and the USA, would thereby closely resemble the governance of the G7.
Similarly to the G7, the 11 participants in the General Arrangements to
Borrow (GAB) – which also constitute the G10 – or the 26 participants in the
New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) are also selected groups of financially
strong industrial countries (or their central banks). In the case of a single
external European representation, the composition of the G10 and of the G7
would become very similar (the only difference being the presence of Switzer-
land in the G10).
The number and impact of international institutions and forums, which
often cover considerable fields in addition to just financial and economic
issues, again point to the complexity involved in streamlining the European
Union’s representation. A single EU chair would have far-reaching conse-
quences and the issue has inextricable links with the establishment of a
common European foreign policy.
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Table 2 External representation of the EU countries
IMF &
G7 G20 G10 World Bank OECD UN WTO
Germany ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
UK ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sweden ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Other EU ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Council ✓
ECB ✓ ✓
Commission ✓ ✓
Other members 3 15 4 169 15 175 129
EU observers Commission Commission Commission Commission
Council ECBa ECB
ECBa
Eurogroupa
Source: Authors’ calculations based on historic IMF and World Bank data.
Note: a For some discussions.
Notes
This article draws on our study for the 2004 Financial Stability Review of the
National Bank of Belgium (Mahieu et al., 2004). We thank in particular Dirk
Heremans, Peter Praet and Thierry Timmermans for their helpful comments. The
usual caveats apply. Géraldine Mahieu was at the time of the drafting of the article
working for the National Bank of Belgium. The opinions expressed remain those
of the author and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European
Commission.
1 For the moment, 97.87% of voting power depends on quotas and 2.13% on
basic votes, which are identical for all members.
2 The eleventh and twelfth general quota reviews were closed in 1997 and 2002,
respectively, and based on 1982–94 and 1987–99 data. The eleventh review
led to an adaptation of actual quotas, the twelfth did not. The thirteenth
review is currently under way. New updated calculations presented in
August 2004 (IMF, 2004) confirm the results of Figure 1.
3 Note that our calculated quotas are different from the quotas calculated by the
Quota Formula Review Group (QFRG), or Cooper Report (IMF, 2001). The
QFRG was an external panel of experts, chaired by Professor Richard Cooper,
which was commissioned by the IMF in 1999 to submit an independent report
on the adequacy of the quota formulas and to make proposals on a formula
that would more closely reflect members’ relative positions in the world
economy as well as their ability to contribute to, and their need for, IMF
resources. This group came up with a calculated quota share for the EU-15 of
28.0%, which was much larger than the US quota of 19.6%, because it excluded
only intra-EU trade in goods. It did not exclude other current account flows
(services, income and current transfers), as we did. We did not exclude current
account flows between the 10 new EU member states owing to a lack of data
during the 1980s and 1990s. However, their effect seems to be insignificant.
4 Thanks to its very open economy and strong economic growth, Singapore has
a large calculated quota. Since Italy and the Netherlands would no longer be
separate members, Singapore could, depending on the future development of
its economy, even rank fifth. However, according to the figures referred to in
note 3, Canada’s calculated quota would remain larger than Singapore’s quota.
5 Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland rotate in the election of their
ED. Sometimes, a non-EU ED thus represents the constituency.
6 Spain is in the same constituency as Mexico and Venezuela, Ireland is with
Canada, and Poland is a member of the Swiss constituency.
7 These are Belarus and Kazakhstan from the Belgian constituency; Armenia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Israel, FYR Macedonia, Moldova and
Ukraine from the Dutch constituency; Iceland and Norway from the Scandi-
navian constituency; Albania, Timor-Leste and San Marino from the Italian
constituency. In addition to these 15 countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey
would change places only if an EU seat were created before their accession
to the EU.
8 An 85% majority is required in 16 categories of decision, such as adjustment
of quotas and votes, provisions for general exchange arrangements, the allo-
cation and cancellation of SDRs and amendments to the Agreement. The lack
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of ratification by the USA of the latest SDR allocation therefore blocks its
implementation.
9 A 70% majority is required for many financial and operational decisions and
the suspension of voting rights.
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